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INTRODUCTION
The Brief of Respondent filed in this matter reflects a substantial and substantive failure

to respond to the arguments which Petitioner has made in this post-conviction relief proceeding.
The State has made erroneous and materially incomplete assertions about the relevant facts of
this case which appear in its "Statement of Facts," its "Issue" and its "Argument." The State's
Argument is comprised of a variety of legal arguments which are either erroneous, superfluous
or relevant only to matters which have already been resolved in the criminal proceeding or to
facts other than those in the record of this matter.
In hopes of providing a coherent response to Brief of Respondent, Mr. Pentico will first
address the erroneous assertions about the facts without regard to where in the Brief of
Respondent those assertions are made. Then, in a separate section of this response, Mr. Pentico
will address the arguments made by the State.
II.

RESPONSES RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS
ABOUT THE RELEVANT FACTS.
The disconnection between this case and the case the State appears to prefer to debate

first manifests within the State's version of the facts relevant to this appeal. There are two
distinct and important instances of this disconnect within the Statement of Facts (one of which
bleeds over into the State's incomplete framing of the "Issue") and two others within the
Argument. 1

1

Distinct but not so important is the fact that the State consistently refers to the visit to the
Governor's Office as having occurred on April 6 when the record in both this case and in State v.
Pentico makes it clear that the visit at issue occurred on April 2, 2008.
1

First, the State attempts to truncate the facts relevant to the resolution of this case by
making reference within the Statement of Facts not to the Record of this case but to the Court of
Appeals summary of the Record as it existed at the close of the criminal proceedings against Mr.
Pentico. Brief of Respondent, p. 1. This attempt to narrow the relevant facts is foundational to a
later argument that Pentico did not create an adequate record to preclude summary dismissal of
his claim for post-conviction relief. The reality is that Pentico has put into the record the factual
foundation which was not, as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, part of the record in
the appeal of State v. Pentico.

Specifically, he has demonstrated that he was, on March 25,

2008, doing nothing more than entering the Capitol grounds on his way to meet with a legislator
for the purpose of seeking her help in addressing a grievance he had with State government.
Wbile he had been to her office earlier that day seeking that meeting, he had not been to the
Governor's office or the Department of Education that day.
While it had the opportunity to do so, the State did not make any attempt to controvert
that factual foundation.

The State offered no affidavits providing admissible evidence relevant

to the circumstances which led up to the demand that Mr. Pentico leave the Capitol grounds and
that he thereafter refrain from returning to those grounds or going to the Governor's office or the
Department of Education.
Second, the State has, in its Statement of Facts, acknowledged the existence of more than
one constitutionally based claim made in Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief but it
only identifies one of them. Brief of Respondent, p. 1.

The State apparently would prefer to

focus the consideration of this Appeal only upon the constitutionality of the "ask to leave" which
occurred on March 25.

But this approach masks over the other properly raised and presented

claims, both premised in the absolute absence of procedural due process.
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Indeed, this March 25 th centric focus carries over to the State's stated "Issue" which
frames the issue in a manner so as to suggest that the only question the Court needs to consider is
whether Mr. Pentico failed to show that the March 25 th "ask to leave" was based upon the
content of his speech. This framing of the issues ignores that Mr. Pentico has consistently
claimed and amply demonstrated that the March 25 th "ask to leave" impaired his efforts to
exercise his right to petition the government for redress of grievances in a manner comm~mly
employed by citizens. In addition, it fails to account for the fact that Mr. Pentico has also raised
significant procedural due process challenges to the application, under the circumstances of this
case, of the one year automatic exclusion.
In both regards, his attorney in the criminal matter failed to raise these constitutional
challenges or to develop the record necessary to preserve them for appeal. However, now that
the claims are raised and the record to support them is established, the State seeks to ignore
them. The State never cites any authority or makes any argument in support of an application of
the statute in a manner that absolutely deprives Mr. Pentico from access to traditional and
designated public forums for one year without regard to the reason that he might seek to enter
those properties and without any form of procedural due process.

2

In the course of its Argument, the State, apparently in recognition that it has no factual
basis for challenging Mr. Pentico's claims about the unconstitutionality of the "ask to leave"
which occurred on March 25, 2008, attempts to draw into the record what it characterizes as
2

The State does mention that Mr. Pentico challenges the "exclusion from certain State property
for a year" but does so in the context of the erroneous assertion that Mr. Pentico premised this
challenge upon an a claim of facial over breadth. Brief of Respondent, p. 9. The State also
seems to claim that a re-entry ban is authorized by Virgina v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003)
but that case does not consider the procedural due process issues and does not appear to have
involved an initial exclusion form a traditional public forum for no apparent reason and
subsequent entry upon a designated public forum for the purpose of using that property in
conformance with its purpose.
3

"evidence" from the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Pentico, Brief of the Respondent, p.
4.

The problem Vvith this attempt, other than the fact that it goes outside of the record in this

matter, is that the Court of Appeals characterized this information only as "references" at
sentencing to possibly relevant conduct. It is not even clear that these "references" were based
upon sworn testimony capable of serving as "evidence" or merely prosecutorial argument based
totally upon hearsay and potentially never capable of being evidence in any proceeding.
Moreover, there is no way to tell from the Court of Appeals' articulation of these prior events
whether the problems arose from the content of speech or from activities which warranted
ejection and exclusion from a traditional public forum. In the end, if the State had evidence it
thought relevant to this matter, it should have filed affidavits. As it did not, Mr. Pentico is
entitled to have the summary dismissal proceed on the record as it exists in this action. As a
consequence, the Affidavit of Mr. Pentico provides the unrebutted evidence which must be
considered in determining if summary dismissal of Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction
relief was warranted.
The final instance which demonstrates the apparent disconnect between the facts of this
case and the facts as the State would prefer them to be also appears in the State's Argument. The
State claims:
"To show that his constitutional rights were violated on March 25, Pentico's trial counsel
would have had to prove that the exclusion from the Governor's offices that day was
based on the content of Pentico' s speech as opposed to a content neutral decision or one
based on non-communicative conduct, volume or active disruption of the activities of
others."
Brief of Respondent at p. 7.

This assertion obviously conflates two separate events but it does

so in a way that suggests a foundational confusion about the issues actually presented in this
case. Mr. Pentico claims and the facts demonstrate that on March 25 th he was, for no apparent
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reason interrupted in the course of seeking to speak to a legislator about a grievance he had with
a governmental entity. There was no need for him to attempt to prove the negative (that the
ejection from the Capitol grounds was premised upon non-content based grounds) because the
right being obstructed was not "speech" but rather the right to "petition" and the unrebutted
evidence clearly demonstrates that this occurred for no apparent reason. On the other hand, Mr.
Pentico's trip to the Governor's office has already been determined not to have involved a
constitutionally protected activity but this fact has nothing to do with a determination of the
constitutionality of the "ask to leave" on March 25 or of Mr. Petico's claims based upon
procedural due process. In sum, the two events are distinct and the issues related to them, at this
point do not involve a question of whether Mr. Pentico's exclusion from the Governor's office
was based upon the content of his "speech" that day, April 2, 2008.
III.

RESPONSES RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S ERRONEOUS ARGUMENTS

Any consideration of the issues raised in this case must begin with a correct appreciation
of the core issues and arguments and recognition of the lack of relevant decisional law. The
Brief of Respondent reflects a failure in both respects.
Indeed, Mr. Pentico cannot identify a single argument set out in the Brief of Respondent
which addresses either of the procedural due process claims asserted by Mr. Pentico (or the
related ineffective assistance of counsel claim) relative to the automatic one year exclusion
provided for in LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) which provides the foundation for criminalizing his April
2nd visit to the Governor's reception area.

Apparently, the State has no response to these

arguments. But, whether it does or it does not, the State has not stated a response and it has not
even acknowledged that these procedural due process claims are an issue before the Court. As
such, the State would appear to be precluded from addressing these due process claims or the
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affiliated ineffective assistance of counsel claim during oral argument.

Rhead v. Hartford Ins.

Co., 135 Idaho 446,452 (2001). The Court and Mr. Pentico should not be required to speculate

as to the specific issues and arguments that the State \\,111 raise at oral argument. Nor should the
State be afforded the tactical advantage of argument-by-ambush which would result by allowing
it to raise issues and present arguments that are not presented within its briefing. Accordingly, it
is appropriate to conclude that the State has waived the opportunity to respond to Mr. Pentico's
procedural due process challenges and to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised
upon those challenges.
As a starting point for an analysis of the issues presented in this case, one must appreciate
that Mr. Pentico contends that, but for the events of March 25, 2008, his conduct on April 2,
2008, (visiting the reception area of the Governor's Office) could never be found to be a
violation of any law of this State. On April 2, 2008, he went to a place which was open during
office hours to all members of the public who wanted to communicate with the Governor or his
staff.

While he was there he delivered a letter expressing concerns and grievances, just as any

member of the public would be free to do. There is no claim or evidence to support a finding
that doing so is not a legitimate reason for going to the Governor's office.

Once the letter was

delivered, he turned and left. There is no claim or evidence that he did anything else. While he
was there he did not violate any rules or regulations and he never refused to leave that office on
that day after being asked to do so.
On these facts, the ruling in State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003)

abrogated in part upon other grounds, Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013), which
the State relies upon, actually provides no authority for charging or convicting him with a
violation of LC. §l 8-7008(A)(8) based solely upon his conduct on April 2, 2008.

6

Indeed,

Korsen, provides very limited guidance which is relevant to any of the issues presented in this

post-conviction ruling proceeding.

The Court held that the statute was not, as to its "ask to

leave" portion, facially overbroad because, even as it could be applied to public property
(specifically government o\\'ned, non-public forums, such as office building), there were many
instances in which the statute could be enforced without adversely impacting a citizen's
protected rights. Korsen at 715-716. But Mr. Pentico is not claiming in this proceeding that the
statute is facially overbroad.
The Korsen Court did not hold that the statute could be applied to all citizens on
government owned property without regard to their reason for being there, that it could be
applied to citizens present on a traditional public forum or that the "one year exclusion" portion
of the statute could be constitutionally applied to Mr. Korsen or any other citizen. Indeed, the
Court specifically acknowledged that there were circumstances (such as presence on the Capitol
grounds) as to which the statute could be overbroad and thus unconstitutional on an "as applied"
basis. 3 Indeed, all that Korsen concluded was that the "ask to leave" portion of the statute was
not facially overbroad and that it could constitutionally be applied to Mr. Korsen where at the
time he was asked to leave he had completed his legitimate business at that government building.
Thus, to the extent that Korsen has any relevance to the claims at issue in this case, it teaches
only that standing alone nothing Mr. Pentico did on April 2, 2008, could be the basis for a
criminal prosecution founded upon LC. § 18-7008(A)(8). Thus, if he was not otherwise legally

3

Here it is worth noting that the State claims, without citation of authority, that the assertion that
statutory overbreadth can be considered and dealt with only as a "facial" or "as applied" basis is
"an erroneous legal assertion" and that any argument premised upon "as applied" overbreadth
can be disregarded. Respondent's Brief at pp. 8-9. Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court
recognizes the concept that a statute may be overbroad as applied and does so with the
expectation that any over-reaching effect of the statute can be cured on a case-by-case basis.
State v. Korsen, at 715, see also, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614-615 (1973).
7

barred from going to the Governor's office, his visit to that office on April 2, 2008, could not be
treated as a trespass pursuant to LC. §18-7008(A)(8).
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 112 (2003) which is also cited by the State is no more helpful

to the resolution of this case than is Korsen.

In Hicks, the Court upheld, against a facial

overbreadth challenge, a criminal trespass prosecution of an individual who had returned to a
housing development owned and operated by a governmental entity after having been previously
ordered to leave and to not return; the similarities between that case and this end there.

In

Hicks, the streets on which Mr. Hicks trespassed had been abandoned by the City and were

clearly posted so as to identify them as private streets and to announce the intention to pursue
trespass charges against anyone who entered them without authorization.

The controlling

governmental entity had adopted a specific policy regulating the use of the streets and to
authorize the police to issue ejection/exclusion notices to any person who used the streets
without being able to demonstrate a "legitimate business or social purpose." Obviously, there is
no similar posting or regulating of the Capitol grounds where Mr. Pentico was initially
confronted or of the Governor's office reception area.
Moreover, the evidence pertaining to Mr. Hicks' specific conduct and to the impact of the
exclusion was materially different from the record in this case.

Mr. Hicks was known to the

regulating entity as a habitual trespasser and vandal. While Mr. Hicks had requested that the
property administrator grant him permission to re-enter and he had been denied that permission
there was no showing that he would have been denied that permission if he had shown that he
had a legitimate business or social purpose or if he had made the request in order to engage in a
constitutionally protected activity. Here there is no evidence that Mr. Pentico was a habitual
trespasser or vandal. There was no regulation, no posting and no need for him or any other

8

citizen to seek permission to enter the Capitol grounds to speak to a legislator or the reception
room of the Governor's office to deliver a letter to the Governor.

Even if the State could

constitutionally regulate access to the Capitol building to those \Vith legitimate business, social or
constitutional purposes, Mr. Pentico's desire to elicit the help of a legislator is consistent with
what happens every day during the legislative session. In addition, it is evident that in the Hicks
case there was an administrator who could be approached for permission - hence some minuscule
procedural due process

here Mr. Pentico could not even find out who had issued the order that

he be excluded. In the end, the only bearing that the decision in Hicks has upon this case is that
it provides at least a basis for the argument that the Korsen Court was correct in concluding that
LC. §18-7008(A)(8) is not facially overbroad. But that is not an issue presented in this case.
Thus, the case law relied upon by the State fails to provide a foundation for a
determination that the "ask to leave" on March 25 th was a constitutionally valid application of
LC.§ 18-7008(A)(8). Moreover, there is no showing that if the "ask to leave" was itself invalid
that the "one year exclusion" could lawfully follow from that invalid "ask to leave." Hence, the
asserted wrongfulness of his conduct on April 2, 2008, turns, not upon what Mr. Pentico did or
did not do while in the reception area of the Governor's office, but rather upon the claim that he
could be, based on the events of March 25, 2008, barred from being there altogether on April 2,
2008.

Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel failed to appreciate this fact.

As a result, he failed to

appreciate the substantial and heretofore unresolved constitutional challenges which arise from a
prosecution based upon Mr. Pentico's visit to a public space in the Governor's office on April 2,
2008, because of events which occurred eight days earlier.

In particular Trial Counsel failed to recognize that:

9

I.

He had available to him, what is thus far, unrebutted evidence that Mr.

Pentico was, on March 25, 2008, peacefully entering the Capitol grounds for the
purpose of speaking to a legislator to seek help in addressing a grievance 'With a
governmental entity. As a consequence, he did not realize that Korsen provided
him with authoritative argument that the "ask to leave" was unconstitutional and
the accompanying "one year exclusion" was not premised on a lawful "ask to
leave" and had no lawful effect.

In this regard, that Idaho Supreme Court

specifically recognized that:
Assuming that a criminal trespass prosecution is filed pursuant to I. C. § 187008(8) sic. against a person on public property who is exercising his or
her free speech rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that
constitutionally protected conduct.
Korsen, Id

2.

Even if there was a lawful basis to ask Mr. Pentico to leave the Capitol

grounds as he was peacefully entering upon them and heading to a meeting with a
Legislator, the seemingly life-time exclusion (or even the one year exclusion set
out in LC. 18-7008(A)(8)) from the Capitol grounds and other identified State
properties where citizens regularly interface with elected officials and
governmental administrators presented compelling and invalidating procedural
due process issues.
Ultimately, the two pronged constitutional challenge which needed to be raised and
which was not raised is: "Can a citizen, who is doing nothing more than entering the Capitol
building in order to speak to a legislator, lawfully be told to leave that property and to stay off of
others and, if so, can he lawfully be automatically barred thereafter from entering identified State
properties for a year."

Mr. Pentico has demonstrated a criminal prosecution premised upon the
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claim that LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) validates such an "ask to leave" and a subsequent "one year
exclusion" has fatal constitutional defects and he has asserted that these defects have never been
addressed or resolved in any decisional law. The State has made no attempt to respond directly
to these arguments and it has failed to direct the Court's attention to any relevant decision which
resolves the constitutional challenges which should have been but were not raised. Instead, the
State offers a number of irrelevant, obtuse and erroneous arguments.
The State seeks to treat this as a "speech" case and to have the Court conclude that
Pentico cannot prevail because he has not shown that he was ordered off of a traditional public
forum based upon the content of his speech as opposed to his conduct. Brief of Respondent pp.
6-7.

This contention ignores both the fact that the First Amendment affords protection to

activity beyond free speech

to petition the Government for redress of grievances - and the

unrebutted evidence that at the time he entered the Capitol grounds Mr. Pentico was on his way
to do just that

in a normal and commonly accepted manner

to speak to a legislator in person.

While this point is important to keep in mind, it does not invalidate the State's argument that the
exercise of First Amendment rights are subject to reasonable time, place and manner,
restrictions.
While such restrictions can be upheld, the State has provided this Court with no evidence
of the existence of any time, place and manner restrictions (let alone reasonable ones) which are
relevant to this case. Indeed, from the record it appears that the State thinks that it is permissible
for State police to order citizens on their way to speak to a legislator about a grievance to leave
State property for any reason or no reason at all. The State has provided this Court with no
authority for such an application of LC. §18-7008(A)(8) and no evidence of any conduct which
would warrant ejection from a traditional public forum (the very government-owned property
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which the Court in Korsen acknowledged would require a different approach than was taken in
that decision).
The State argues that the unrebutted evidence of Mr. Pentico's mission is insufficient
because he has not proven that the "ask to leave" was premised upon his protected conduct as
opposed to unprotected conduct, Brief of Respondent p. 8. Other than unreasonably expecting
him to prove a negative when, if any relevant evidence exists it is in possession of the State
(though not disclosed to the Court), this assertion ignores the clear import of the evidence in the
records. And in summary dismissal proceedings Mr. Pentico is entitled to the benefit of the
reasonable inference that he did not engage in any unprotected conduct. Given that the State has
failed to put any evidence in the record which could rebut this inference, there is no basis upon
which to conclude that there was a reasonable basis for asking him to leave a traditional public
forum or directing him to thereafter stay off of traditional and designated public forums. Thus,
there is not only a question of fact which could be resolved in favor of Mr. Pentico and which
justifies the requested relief, there is a question of fact which must be resolved in his favor. On
this record there is no merit to the claim that he has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating
a prima facie case in support of his claim that he was unconstitutionally ejected from a traditional
public forum and excluded from both that traditional public forum but also a designated public
forum.
Similarly, the State appears to contend that Mr. Pentico cannot prevail in this matter
because he has not shown that the instruction that he not return to the Capitol and that he stay off
of identified government owned properties was a response to his speech as opposed to his
conduct. Brief of Respondent p. 8. This argument continues the attempt to make Mr. Pentico
responsible to prove the negative when the State possesses any evidence that the order was
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premised upon conduct subject to regulation but it also ignores Mr. Pentico's assertion that given
the clear and expressed structure of the unambiguous statute (which the courts of this State are
obligated to accept without regard to whether the result seems rational, Verska v St Alphonsus
RMC, 151 Idaho 889, 895-896, 265 P.3d 502, 508-509(2011)) the validity of the exclusion turns

upon whether a valid "ask to leave" occurred.

As no valid and enforceable "ask to leave"

occurred in this case there could be no ongoing exclusion.
Moreover, this argument ignores that Mr. Pentico's primary challenge to the "one year
exclusion" is based upon the forfeiture without any form of procedural due process of his right to
proceed as any other citizen to move about and to petition the government. The closest that the
State comes to even acknowledging that the procedural due process issue has been an issue since
the filing of the petition for post-conviction relief is an attempt to deflect the argument by
claiming that Mr. Pentico has not shown that the one year exclusion actually curtailed his access
to a public forum or his exercise of "his right to free speech." Brief of Respondent pp. 10-11.
The facts of this case demonstrate that Mr. Pentico was arrested while in the process of pursuing
his right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances in a designated public forum
and in a fashion available to all other citizens. Clearly his access was, by the State Police, seen
as being curtailed. The fact that he did not thereafter go onto the Capitol grounds carrying a sign
protesting his exclusion from those grounds in order to show that he would have been arrested
should not be held against him as the failure to do so is a rational response to having been
stopped, cuffed and cited after merely delivering a letter to the Governor's office.
The State seeks to capitalize on the fact that Mr. Pentico did not disprove or deny matters
which are not in the record, which are not demonstrated by any evidence offered by the State,
which are not even clearly based upon evidence as opposed to argument and which are not
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clearly conduct issues as opposed to content issues. Brief of Respondent p.8.

It would appear

that the State is attempting to avoid the existence of a question of fact in a situation in which it
made no attempt to properly raise one by urging the Court to require Mr. Pentico to prove
negatives.

Mr. Pentico contends that there is no evidence in this record and indeed no

"evidence" that his "no reason at all" ejection on March 25, 2008, was based on anything other
than the fact that he entered the Capitol grounds on that day to seek assistance of a legislator in
an attempt to redress his grievance with government. If such evidence exists, it was the State's
responsibility to present it, not Mr. Pentico' s responsibility to rule out its existence.
The State attempts to frame Mr. Pentico's challenge to the exclusion as an overbreadth
claim. Brief of Respondent pp. 8-9.

Then it attacks that claim as being based on an erroneous

legal argument (that there is no "as applied" overbreadth claim), Brief of Respondent p.9 and as
lacking an evidentiary foundation (no evidence Pentico was "exercising any constitutional rights
on April 6" (sic), Brief of Respondent p.9).

While there are issues with both of these assertions,

neither, even if completely accurate, is relevant to the claims stated in the petition for postconviction relief or in any of the briefing. Mr. Pentico's challenge to the exclusion portion of the
statute, without which his visit to the Governor's reception room would not have been a trespass,
is not based upon an overbreadth claim.
Mr. Pentico has claimed the one year exclusion is an impermissible prior restraint upon
his exercise of his First Amendment Rights (speech and protest) and therefore works as a
forfeiture of these rights.

He has also claimed that this forfeiture of rights as well as the

exclusion itself (preventing him from going where other citizens can freely go to conduct
business with the government) are both impermissible because the statute mandates the exclusion
without regard to the circumstances and justifications for the "ask to leave" and makes no
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provision for any form of pre-ejection or post-ejection procedural due process.

Without a

procedure that affords him the opportunity to challenge the basis for the exclusion or the scope or
duration of the exclusion he is left with no protection against completely arbitrary and
unreasonable enforcement. 4

The State's argument regarding overbreadth simply does not

address either of these issues.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse the
Order Granting Summary Dismissal

and remand the matter to the Trial Court for further

proceedings in accordance with this Courts determination of the issue raised herein.
~

DATED, this ~__ day of February, 2014.

Jms~~ ·~

HEIDI
Attorney for Defendant

It is worth noting that while a challenge based upon the lack of procedural due process does not
seem to require a specific showing that the exclusion would have been removed ifthere has been
some form of due process proceeding, the record in this case, as it currently stands, demonstrates
that in Mr. Pentico's case the one year exclusion was triggered by a baseless and unconstitutional
"ask to leave." Hence, on this record there is every reason to believe he would have benefitted
from a due process procedure.
4
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